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In recent years beneficiaries of Pennsylvania trusts have in-
creasingly sought to terminate the trusts. Most of these attempts
have begun and ended in the Orphans' Courts. In general, these
courts have responded with a flexible approach which leans heavily on
what might be called equitable considerations.' At the same time the
courts are making certain that it is they, rather than the beneficiaries,
who make the decisions.
This article will deal with the three grounds which resourceful
beneficiaries have most often advanced for the termination of trusts:
(1) the consent of all the parties in interest; (2) the failure of the
purpose for which the trust was created; and (3) mistake as to the
terms or effect of the trust.2
I
TERMINATION UPON CONSENT OF PARTIES IN INTEREST
If the settlor of an inter vivos trust is living and joins with all
persons beneficially interested in the trust in requesting termination,
the trust will be terminated even though the purpose of its creation
has not been fulfilled. In Bowers' Trust Estate,' the settlor of an
inter vivos spendthrift trust joined with all persons beneficially in-
terested in the trust in requesting its termination. The Court ordered
that it be terminated, even though the special purpose of the trust
had not been fulfilled. The trust had been created by a woman in
contemplation of her marriage, the income to be paid to herself for
her sole and separate use for life and on her death to her son, who
tLecturer, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.A., Yale University,
1949, LL.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1952. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1 The courts do not deal with the problem of termination entirely unaided by
legislation. Section 2(a) of the Estates Act of 1947 is particularly relevant.
(a) Failure of original purpose. The court having jurisdiction of a
trust . . . regardless of any spendthrift or similar provision therein, in its
discretion may terminate such trust in whole or in part . . . provided the
court after hearing is satisfied that the original purpose of the conveyor
cannot be carried out or is impractical of fulfillment and that the termination
• . . more nearly approximates the intention of the conveyor, and notice is
given to all parties in interest . ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.2(a) (Supp. 1966).
2 Other methods for ending a trust include revocation, the expiration of the term
and impossibility or illegality of purpose. See 3 Scorr, TRusTs, §§ 330, 334, 335 (2d
ed. 1956, Supp. 1965).
3 346 Pa. 85, 29 A.2d 519 (1943).
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would receive the principal partly at age twenty-five and partly at
age thirty. The son reached the age of thirty-five, acquiring what all
conceded to be an indefeasible interest, and assigned his interest to the
life tenant. Her petition to terminate the trust was granted. The
Court expressly adopted the rule of section 338 of the Restatement
of Trusts, that if all parties in interest agree, a trust may be terminated
notwithstanding that its purpose has not been accomplished.' The
rule was reaffirmed in Schellentrager v. Tradesmens National Bank &
Trust Co.5
Prior to Bowers there was a line of older cases in Pennsylvania
standing for the proposition that where a settlor creates a spendthrift
trust for himself he may not thereafter terminate it.' These decisions
would seem to have been effectively overruled by Bowers and Schellen-
trager. However, a recent, decision by the Orphans' Court of Phila-
delphia indicates that the reasoning of the pre-Bowers cases still has
considerable vitality. In Palermo Trust,' a young woman, crippled
in a railroad accident, had been prevailed upon to create an irrevocable
spendthrift trust of the proceeds of her accident claim. Under it, the
trustee was to pay her the income and such amounts of principal as
he thought necessary for her support. The remainder was payable
to her estate. A year later she changed her mind and sought
to terminate the trust, claiming a right to do so under Bowers; the
trustee joined in her petition, which was opposed only by a
"trustee ad litem" appointed by the Court." The Court refused to
terminate, relying on the early Pennsylvania cases for the proposition
that one who creates a spendthrift trust for himself constitutes himself
a "ward of the court," ' and cannot terminate the trust without the
Court's approval.
The court sought to distinguish Bowers by pointing out that
there the "trust had run its course" 10 while here the settlor, a
paraplegic absolutely dependent on others, was under an "incapacity"
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, § 338 (1959). See also id. § 339.
5370 Pa. 501, 88 A.2d 773 (1952). Lower court cases applying the Bowers
rule include, Chase Trust, Pa. 7 D. & C.2d 519 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1956);
Goodell's Estate, 53 Pa. D. & C. 13 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct 1945); Ammon's
Trust Estate, 52 Pa. D. & C. 509 (Berks County Orphans' Ct 1944).
6 Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 310 Pa. 301, 165 Atl. 380 (1933);
King v. York Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141, 122 Atl. 227 (1923); Willard v. Integrity
Trust Co., 273 Pa. 24, 116 Atl. 513 (1922) ; Fry v. Mercantile Trust Co., 207 Pa. 640,57
AtI. 43 (1904) ; Potter v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & Safe Deposit Co. (No. 1), 199 Pa. 360,
49 Atl. 85 (1901) ; Rynd v. Baker, 193 Pa. 486, 44 Atl. 551 (1899) ; Reidy v. Small;
154 Pa. 505, 26 Atl. 602 (1893) ; Ashurst's Appeal, 77 Pa. 464 (1875).
715 Fid. Rep. 74 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1963).
8 It does not appear who the trustee ad litem represented, since no one but the
settlor had an interest in the trust.
1 15 Fid. Rep. at 83.
Old. at 81.
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that subjected her to the court's control."1 It is difficult to see how
this decision comports with Bowers, especially in light of the Supreme
Court's statement that to deny the settlor the right to terminate a
trust in which he holds all the interests "in effect prevents a person
from doing as he pleases with his own property." I Nevertheless,
the court in Palermo asserted its power to limit this right.'3
If the creator of the trust is dead, the beneficiaries may terminate
it only if its purposes have been fulfilled.'4 Implicit in this rule is the
view that a "material purpose" is not deduced merely from the
existence of the trust. A concrete expression of this view is
Stafford's Estate,' where the remainderman acquired the life estate,
and the court terminated the trust on finding that its purpose had
merely been to protect the corpus during the pendency of the life
estate. Another example is Wood's Estate,6 where the life tenant
had a general power to appoint the remainder, and the court ter-
minated the trust at her request on the ground that the trust did not
support remainders and was "passive." 17
11 It is difficult to read Bowers as the court did in Palermo. In Bowers the
Supreme Court adopted the rule of section 338 of the Restatement of Trusts, allowing
all interested parties to terminate a trust "although the purpose of the trust has not
been accomplished." Palermo read Bowers as "not expressly over-ruling" the earlier
Pennsylvania decisions, 15 Fid. Rep. at 81, but Bowers surely disapproved of these
decisions by describing them as "not . . .. in accord with [the Restatement's] pro-
nouncements." 346 Pa. at 88, 29 A.2d at 520. Palermno also relied on the Restate-
met's exception in section 339 that a person under an "incapacity" cannot join in a
termination of a trust, and concluded that this applied to a crippled settlor. However,
"incapacity" in section 339 of the Restatement clearly means legal incapacity and
expressly does not include a person who manages his affairs unwisely.
12 346 Pa. at 89, 29 A.2d at 521.
13 Palermo has some company. In Collins v. Provident Trust Co. of Phila., 83
Pa. D. & C. 459 (Montgomery County C.P. 1952), a spendthrift trust was held not
terminable because all parties in interest were not represented. But the court, in a
brief final paragraph, also said that solely because the trust was a spendthrift trust,
it could not be revoked in any event, citing one of the pre-Bowers cases.
14 See generally 3 Scor, TRUSTS § 337 (2d ed. 1956), where the rule is compared
to the rule in England that a trust may be terminated upon the consent of all the
beneficiaries, whether or not there is a material purpose still to be served by its
continuance. Some early Pennsylvania cases suggest the English rule. See Culbert-
son's Appeal, 76 Pa. 145 (1874), where the court granted termination declaring that
if all interested parties consent, a trust may be terminated even though its purposes
have not been accomplished. However, the court also stated that since the children
were of age, the purpose of the trust had been completed. In Yarnall's Appeal, 70
Pa. 335 (1872), termination of a spendthrift trust was granted on a finding that the
life tenant had a fee simple, and nothing was said about the spendthrift clause or any
other "purpose" of the trust.
15 258 Pa. 595, 102 Ati. 222 (1917).
16261 Pa. 480, 104 Atl. 673 (1918).
17 More recent examples of the rule include Holmes Estate, 66 Pa. D. & C. 612
(Delaware County Orphans' Ct. 1949) and McClain Estate, 69 Pa. D. & C. 29 (Fulton
County Orphans' Ct. 1949). In the former, the court terminated a sole and separate
use trust where the beneficiary was not married nor in contemplation of marriage
at the time the trust was created. In the latter, a trust was terminated on the petition
of the beneficiaries on a finding that the testator's purpose was merely to preserve the
corpus for the remaindermen, and not to protect the widow-life tenant to whom he
had given outright a substantial portion of his estate.
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The principal example of a material purpose is a spendthrift trust.
Except for one or two of the earliest cases,' 8 it has been held uniformly
in Pennsylvania that a testamentary spendthrift trust may not be
terminated at the request of all the beneficiaries, although the rationale
has varied widely from case to case.-9 A second recognized "purpose"
is found in charitable trusts, which will not be terminated at the re-
quest of the charity."° A third example is a discretionary or support
trust.21 Other examples include trusts for persons under a disability.2
Most discussions of the subject give the impression that a trust
will be readily terminated if it does not fit into one of these established
IS E.g., Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. 335 (1872).
19 The leading case is Bosler Estate, 378 Pa. 333, 107 A.2d 443 (1954), which
stressed the testator's right to dispose of his property as he wished. In Borsch Estate,
362 Pa. 581, 67 A.2d 119 (1949), the Supreme Court went so far as to hold a spend-
thrift clause a "property right." In Grote Trust, 390 Pa. 261, 135 A.2d 383 (1957),
the court cited Bosler and Borsch with approval.
The long line of earlier cases includes: Heyl Estate, 352 Pa. 407, 43 A.2d 130
(1945), Harrison's Estate, 322 Pa. 532, 185 Atl. 766 (1936) (no termination of trust
with remainder to charity under Act of April 14, 1931, P.L. 29); Moser's Estate,
270 Pa. 217, 113 Atl. 199 (1921) (no merger of spendthrift life estate and remainder) ;
Fox's Estate, 264 Pa. 478, 107 At. 863 (1919) (no termination though spendthrift
life tenant and trustee same person) ; Simonin's Estate, 260 Pa. 395, 103 At. 927
(1918) (semble); Moore's Estate, 198 Pa. 611, 48 At. 884 (1901) (no merger of
spendthrift life estate and remainder). See also Close Estate, 83 Pa. D. & C. 136
(Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1953). There are at least three recent cases which have
permitted the termination of testamentary spendthrift trusts contrary to the general
rule. One is Kelby Estate, 80 Pa. D. & C. 1 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1952), where
the court admittedly was extending the rule of Bowers, involving inter vivos trusts,
to testamentary trusts. Being somewhat unsure of this, however, the court allowed
termination on the second and independent ground of failure of purpose. (The principal
had shrunk.) See Honeywell Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 472 (Montgomery County
Orphans' Ct. 1950), which is quite similar.
In Wormser Estate, 85 Pa. D. & C. 526 (Lackawanna County Orphans' Ct.
1953), the court held that the life tenants had a fee, and granted termination, saying
the spendthrift clause was immaterial. It cited cases holding that the owner of a
life estate with a general power of appointment has a fee, even though a spendthrift
clause exists. The cases cited were not termination cases, but all involved the question
of whether a subsequent beneficiary is bound by the life tenant's acquiescence or other
conduct.
20 Baughman's Estate, 281 Pa. 23, 126 Atl. 58 (1924), in which the court said
that testator had created a trust to keep the beneficiary (a church) from consuming
the corpus; cf. Biehl Estate, 35 D. & C. 148 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1965), where
funds bequeathed to a corporate trustee in trust for four charities were awarded
directly to the charities because the named trustee had no legal power to act as such.
21 Spring's Estate, 216 Pa. 529, 66 Atl. 110 (1907). See Bnac-y, Im rsTATE,
W.LS AND ESTATES AcTs OF 1947 at 5157 (1949). This is not considered a material
purpose in England. See 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 337.4 (2d ed. 1956, Supp. 1965).
22 Several cases have involved trusts created for the benefit of 'a beneficiary who
was under a disability, such as minority, incompetency, coverture or drunkenness,
which subsequently ceased. See 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 337.5 (2d ed. 1956, Supp. 1965).
In Simon's Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C. 475 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1939) and in Dodson
v. Ball, 68 Pa. 492 (1869), a woman was allowed to terminate a trust for her benefit,
following divorce. However, in Moore's Estate, 35 Pa. D. & C. 694 (Philadelphia
Orphans' Ct. 1939), the court refused to hold that a divorce terminated a trust
created for the benefit of a grandson during his marriage. See also King v. York
Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141, 122 Atl. 227 (1923), where a spendthrift trust was created
by a man fearing incompetency, and the court refused to terminate it many years
later at the request of the settlor and some of the other beneficiaries. See Willard
v. Integrity Trust Co., 273 Pa. 24, 116 Atl. 513 (1922) for a trust created by a
drunkard.
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categories of "material purpose." " As noted, the rule itself is based
on an assumption that the necessary purpose is not derived merely
from the creation of the trust, and Pennsylvania decisions such as
Stafford and Wood support this conclusion. However, there are a
number of cases refusing to terminate trusts, involving neither spend-
thrift clauses nor support. This is done on the broad ground, vari-
ously stated, that the testator intended a trustee to manage the
property for the beneficiary and that the intent must be carried out.
This attitude was indistinctly suggested by the Supreme Court in
Grazier's Estate,24 and in Slater Estate.5 It was made the basis
of the decision in Cannistra Estate,26 where termination at the request
of the beneficiaries was refused because there was an ultimate purpose
to be served in continuing the trust. This purpose was stated to be
merely that the testator intended to create an active trust and his
intention would be carried out.
27
A 1962 decision of the Philadelphia Orphans' Court illustrates
and emphasizes this attitude and suggests that in general all tiusts
have a purpose to be carried out. Matthews Trust' s involved an
attempted termination of a spendthrift trust by a release of the life
estate in favor of the remainderman under section 3(a) of the
Estates Act of 1947.29 It is significant that in his decision Judge
LeFever said very little about the spendthrift clause as creating a
2 3 1n BREGY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES Acrs OF 1947 (1949), the author
states that aside from spendthrift and support trusts
special purposes are rare. The mere fact that the trust is by its terms
supposed to last until the life tenant's death does not constitute a special
purpose. Nor does the fact that the trust was supposed to last until the
income beneficiary reached a certain age.
Id. at 5157. He refers to the cases holding that a trust to pay income to a person
until he reaches a certain age, and then to pay him the principal, is an absolute gift.
Decker Estate, 353 Pa. 509, 46 A.2d 218 (1946) ; Allen Estate, 347 Pa. 364, 32 A.2d
301 (1943) ; Zamichielli Estate, 81 Pa. D. & C. 288 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1952).
A gift over upon the death of the beneficiary before reaching the stated age prevents
this result. Africa Estate, 359 Pa. 567, 59 A.2d 925 (1948). This is the rule in
England, and apparently Pennsylvania is the only American state that follows it.
See 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 337.3 (2d ed. 1956, Supp. 1965).
24301 Pa. 422, 153 AtI. 390 (1930).
2-316 Pa. 56, 173 Atl. 399 (1934).
26 384 Pa. 605, 121 A.2d 157 (1956).
27These cases borrow heavily from the so-called "active trust" cases of many
years ago which generally dealt with whether a purported gift in trust created an
"active trust" which would be sustained, or whether it was a "passive trust" executed
by the Statute of Uses. See, e.g., Knight's Estate, 235 Pa. 149, 83 Atl. 709 (1912)
(sole and separate use trust for daughter with general testamentary power of appoint-
ment, held active trust which she could not terminate) ; Shower's Estate, 211 Pa. 297,
60 Atl. 789 (1905) (trust to pay income to children, silent as to remainder, held
active) ; Earp's Appeal, 75 Pa. 119 (1874) (trust to pay income to testator's children,
with general testamentary power of appointment and gift in default of appointment,
held active trust and sustained over children's efforts to extinguish it).
28 12 Fid. Rep. 653 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962).
2 9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.3 (a) (Supp. 1967).
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special purpose, but more broadly stated that to construe section 3
of the Estates Act to permit the release
. . . would open the door to the termination of all trusts,
spendthrift or not . . . where the life tenant and remainder-
men are named and interests are vested. In such cases the
agreeing parties, by whimsy or caprice, could circumvent
the carefully considered and well-laid plan of testator or
settlor to dispose of his property 0
Obviously for a trust to be terminated by the consent of the
beneficiaries, all persons with interests in the trust must join. Many
of the cases in this area involve the question of whether those consent-
ing to the termination in fact hold all the beneficial interests in the
trust.3 ' Often the answer hinges on whether the gift of the remainder
is phrased in such a way that under traditional rules of property the
life tenant has a fee simple. 2
Where, as is often the case, there are beneficial interests in an
indefinite group such as "issue," some of whom may be minors or
SO 12 Fid. Rep. at 658. See also White Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 606 (Philadel-
phia Orphans' Ct. 1961), where the same court refused a petition to terminate, relying
principally on the old doctrine of active trusts exemplified by Earp's Appeal, 75 Pa.
119 (1874).
S1 In a number of cases it was unquestionable that at least one interested party
had not joined. Kamerly Estate, 348 Pa. 225, 35 A.2d 258 (1944) ; Donnan's Trust
Estate, 339 Pa. 43, 13 A.2d 55 (1940) ; Gill's Estate, 293 Pa. 199, 142 Atl. 207 (1928) ;
Jones' Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 91, 130 Atl. 314 (1925). See also Africa Estate,
359 Pa. 567, 59 A.2d 925 (1948) ; King v. York Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141, 122 Atl. 227
(1923) ; Lieberman v. Fabricant, 59 Pa. D. & C. 443 (Philadelphia C.P. 1946).
- Remainder to the "heirs" of the life tenant may give him a fee. See, e.g.,
Thorne's Estate, 344 Pa. 503, 25 A.2d 511 (1942). But see Grazier's Estate, 301 Pa.
422, 153 Atl. 390 (1930). See 3 Sco-rr, TRUSTS § 340 (2d ed. 1956), which suggests
a difference based on whether the life tenant is the settlor, and on whether the Rule
in Shelley's Case applies. Where the remainder is to such persons as the life tenant
appoints by will, with a gift in default of appointment to his "heirs" or the equivalent,
the life tenant has been held to have a fee and may terminate the trust Mogridge's
Estate, 342 Pa. 308, 20 A.2d 307. (1941); Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. 335 (1872);
Dodson v. Ball, 60 Pa. 492 (1869); Chase Trust, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 519 (Philadelphia
Orphans' Ct. 1956). See also Horner Estate, 5 Fid. Rep. 648 (Philadelphia Orphans'
Ct 1955) and Reiniger's Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C. 163 (Berks County Orphans' Ct.
1939). But cf. Rech's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 466 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct 1933),
where the court refused to terminate, holding the rule of Dodson v. Ball applicable
only where the life tenant is the settlor. It failed to refer to Yarnall's Appeal, where
the life tenant was not the settlor. If there is no gift over after a general power,
some cases appear to conclude that the life tenant has a fee and can terminate. See
Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288, 156 Atl. 84 (1931) ; Wood's Estate, 261 Pa. 480, 104
Ati. 673 (1918) ; Miller Trust, 27 Pa. D. & C. 239 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962).
In other cases, the courts have analyzed the facts to see who would take in default
of exercise of the power. See Nelson v. Jackson, 354 Pa. 512, 47 A.2d 650 (1946)
(intestacy, and life tenant was sole intestate heir); Jackson Trust, 351 Pa. 89, 40
A.2d 393 (1945) (reversion in settlor, who held the power) ; Ammon's Trust Estate,
52 Pa. D. & C. 509 (Berks County Orphans' Ct. 1944) (reversion in holder of power).
Where the gift in default of appointment is to the "issue" or "children!' of the
donee of the power, he does not have a fee. See Johnson v. Provident Trust Co.,
280 Pa. 255, 124 Atl. 436 (1924); Dodson v. Ball, supra; Rebmann Trust, 2 Fid.
Rep. 288 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct 1952). See also McCreary Trust, 354 Pa. 347,
47 A.2d 235 (1946) ; Rickenbach Estate, 348 Pa. 121, 34 A.2d 527 (1943) ; Collins v.
Provident Trust Co., 83 Pa. D. & C. 459 (Montgomery County C.P. 1952).
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unborn persons, consent of all interested parties is impossible. In some
cases where the "issue" are of a living person, for example the life
tenant, termination has been decreed on a finding that it is impossible
for that person to have issue." Here the courts have been quite
liberal. Another possibility would be for the Court to appoint a
guardian or trustee ad litem to represent minor and unborn bene-
ficiaries, and to consent to termination in their behalf. There seems
to be no authority concerning the power, or lack of power, of a
guardian or trustee ad litem to give such consent. As a practical
matter a guardian's consent will rarely be determinative since a court
can, notwithstanding such consent, find that there is a material pur-
pose for continuing the trust. The matter thus has significance only
where the settlor is alive. In any event, in practice, guardians ad litem
generally seem to oppose termination. 4
Where a life tenant has the power to appoint the remainder, a
gift in default of appointment to his issue, or to another class that
includes minors or unborn persons, makes it impossible to obtain the
consent of all beneficiaries. In such cases the life tenant may seek to
utilize his power of appointment to cut off such interests. If, for
instance, the power is exercisable by deed, he may at any time exercise
it in favor of someone willing to consent to the termination of the
trust.3 Most powers, however, are testamentary only, and it should
be clear that the donee of the power cannot make immediately effective,
in advance of his death, a will exercising the power for the purpose
of terminating the trust.36 Nor is it likely that the donee of a power
33 Bonham Estate, 393 Pa. 355, 143 A.2d 50 (1958) ; Kelby Estate, 80 Pa. D. & C. 1
(Philadelphia County Orphans' Ct 1961); Honeywell Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 472
(Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. 1950); Leonard's Estate, 60 Pa. D. & C. 42
(Dauphin County Orphans' Ct 1947); Barnsley Estate, 59 Pa. D. & C. 653 (Mont-
gomery County Orphans' Ct. 1947).
34 See, e.g., Matthews Trust, 12 Fid. Rep. 653 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct.
1962) ; White Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 606 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1961);
Close Estate, 83 Pa. D. & C. 136 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct 1953). In Jones' Trust
Estate, 284 Pa. 90, 130 Atl. 314 (1925), guardians for minor beneficiaries "submitted
themselves to the judgment of the court," which denied termination because of the
existence of contingent remainders in those beneficiaries. Id. at 92, 130 AtI. at 315.
35 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 340 (2d ed. 1956, Supp. 1965). Virtually the same result
was accomplished in Goodell's Estate, 53 Pa. D. & C. 13 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct.
1945), through the exercise by the settlor of a reserved power to modify the trust.
He exercised it by naming his mother remainderman, and she then joined with him
to terminate.
3 6 However, just this sort of thing has been tried, and in one case it was actually
successful. In Reininger's Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C. 163 (Berks County Orphans' Ct.
1939), the income was payable to a daughter for life, with a general testamentary
power in her to appoint the principal, which would pass to her heirs at law in default
of appointment. The daughter executed a will, presumably exercising her power
of appointment in favor of certain of her heirs who were joining with her in seeking
to terminate the trust, and her petition included a request that her will be filed with
the Register of Wills, so that she might not die intestate. The court stated that the
purported wvill was ineffctive, and could not be onsidered in any way in connection
with determining whether all parties in interest had consented to the termination.
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could terminate a trust by contracting to make a will in which the
power would be exercised in favor of persons who consent to the
termination. 7
Recent cases, like Matthews Trust,"s indicate that the courts
will not participate in efforts of beneficiaries to cut off interests of
The parties were more successful in Elliot Estate, 88 Pa. D. & C. 528 (Lycoming
County Orphans' Ct. 1953), where a will gave the residue of the estate in trust (no
spendthrift clause) to pay the income to the testator's three children for life. On
the death of the last surviving child, the principal was to pass under a general testa-
mentary power of appointment in each child, who also had a power to appoint the
income should he die before the termination of the trust. Gifts in default of appoint-
ment were given to each child's issue, or to the testator's grandchildren. Two of
the three children, and their wives and children, petitioned to terminate their shares of
the trust. Both testified that they had executed wills exercising the powers in favor
of their wives or children, and took an oath that they would not change these wills.
On the strength of this, the court terminated the trusts on the ground that everyone
in interest had consented to the termination except the settlor, with respect to whom
there was a "failure of purpose" because of the decrease in the amount of the income.
Under the precept that a will is always revocable, it is hard to justify the conclu-
sion that by an oath this testator lost the power to change his will, particularly in
view of the possibility that his named legatees might predecease him. While a
contract to make a will can, as a practical matter, limit testamentary freedom, it is
difficult to fit this case into the pattern of such a contract; did, for instance, the
beneficiaries named in the "irrevocable" will give consideration sufficient to prevent
the testator from subsequently revoking it?
37 See Estate of Thomas Robb, No. 17, July Term, 1903 (Philadelphia Orphans'
Ct., June 22, 1961), in which a unilateral "agreement" by the donee of a testamentary
power to exercise it in favor of certain persons who joined in her petition to terminate,
was held ineffective. See also RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 340 (1940), which bases its
position on the view that the donor of the power intended that the donee retain until
death the discretion to exercise it. The meager reported Pennsylvania authority
appears to agree. See Hays' Estate, 286 Pa. 520, 134 AtI. 402 (1925); Bailey's
Estate, 276 Pa. 147, 151, 119 Atl. 907, 908-09 (1923), 287 Pa. 478, 135 At. 109 (1926),
291 Pa. 421, 140 At. 145 (1927) ; Boyd v. Bigham, 4 Pa. 102 (1846) ; Trust Under
Deed of Levering, 9 Pa. D. & C. 328, 330-31 (Philadelphia C.P. 1927). See also
Scott's Estate, 353 Pa. 575, 46 A.2d 174 (1946) ; Duff's Estate, 7 Pa. D. & C. 105
(Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1926).
This is to be contrasted to the donee's right to release a power, thus effectively
passing the property to the takers in default of exercise. A general power may be
released, RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 334 (1940)-even though this frustrates the
donor's intent that the donee retain the discretion until his death-and one method to
effectuate such a release is a contract with a taker in default not to exercise the
power. Id. § 336; BREGY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 5209. As a result of § 3 of the
Estates Act of 1947 (and its prior statutory counterparts in 1943 and 1945) a special
power of appointment may also be released, id. at 5210, although this is contrary to
the RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 335 (1940). Before the Act of 1943, P.L. 797 (prede-
cessor to § 3 of the Estates Act), it seemed clear that a general power could be
released in Pennsylvania. See Jackson Trust, 351 Pa. 89, 40 A.2d 393 (1945);
Mogridge's Estate, 342 Pa. 308, 20 A.2d 307 (1941); Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa.
288, 156 Atl. 84 (1931). The Lyon case indicated that this did not apply to a special
power.
One problem has been that of spendthrift trusts. Before the Act of 1943, not
only could a spendthrift interest not be transferred or released, it could not even be
disclaimed or renounced at the outset. BREGY, op. cit. mtpra note 23, at 5222-23. The
Act of 1943 made clear that powers could be released, and the Act of 1945 extended
this to interests including spendthrift interests. Id. at 5223. This was held inapplicable
to pre-existing trusts. Borsch Estate, 362 Pa. 581, 67 A.2d 119 (1949) ; BREGY, op.
cit. supra n.23, at 5224. The Estates Act of 1947, § 3(a), made the release of powers
completely inapplicable to spendthrift interests, but in 1956 the Act was amended to
restore the power to release a spendthrift interest, but only in favor of the descendants
of the owner of the interest. Act of April 1, 1956, P.L. 1073.
as 12 Fid. Rep. 653 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962).
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parties who are unable to consent. That decision refused to interpret
section 3 of the Estates Act of 1947 to permit a release of a life
estate in favor of the remaindermen in order to terminate a trust.
It is likely that an attempt to accomplish the same result through the
release or exercise of a power of appointment will meet the same fate.
Matthews Trust also reveals that the courts will narrowly con-
strue legislative efforts to change the rules. In narrowly interpreting
section 3(a) of the Estates Act of 1947 to permit no termination at
all, the court compared it to section 2(a), which grants the courts
power to terminate trusts up to $25,000, notwithstanding a spendthrift
provision.39 The latter, it said, is a true termination provision. Sig-
nificantly, section 2(a) reposes the power to terminate in the courts,
and the courts have construed it liberally." In contrast, section 3 (a)
gives rights to the trust beneficiaries, exercisable without court control
or participation. The different interpretations of these two provisions,
both intended to be remedial, emphasizes the courts' attitude that the
continued existence or termination of trusts should be, so far as
possible, a matter of court discretion and not of the "whimsy or
caprice" of the beneficiaries.
The trend of the decisions involving termination by consent of
the beneficiaries is toward increased court control. The "material
purpose" of a trust that will override beneficiaries' attempts to ter-
minate now appears to be found in almost every trust. By its
very vagueness, that phrase has given the courts a broad discretion
which the beneficiaries can neither limit nor influence, except in the
area of inter vivos trusts where the settlor is still alive. The consent
of all the beneficiaries is still essential, for without it a trust cannot
technically be terminated by consent, regardless of the lack of a
material purpose. But in view of the growing tendency of Penn-
sylvania courts to find a material purpose merely from the creation
of a trust, and the difficulty of obtaining the consent of all interested
parties, the consent of the beneficiaries is losing its significance as a
ground for terminating trusts.
II
TERMINATION FOR FAILURE OF PURPOSE
Section 2 (a) of the Estates Act of 1947 41 permits the court, in
its discretion, to terminate any trust, notwithstanding a spendthrift
provision,
39 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.2(a) (Supp. 1967).4 0 E.g., Ryan Trust, 11 Fid. Rep. 292 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct), aff'd sub nom.
Ryan Estate, 404 Pa. 229, 127 A.2d,584 (1961) (per curiam), holding a court may
terminate a spendthrift trust under § 2(a), even over the objection of parties bene-
ficially interested.4
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.2 (a) (Supp. 1967).
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provided the court after hearing is satisfied that the original
purpose of the conveyor cannot be carried out or is im-
practical of fulfillment and that termination, partial termina-
tion, or allowance [from principal] more nearly approxi-
mates the intention of the conveyor ....
Notice is required "to all parties in interest." If the court finds a
failure of purpose it may then distribute principal "as it deems proper
and as nearly as possible in conformity with the conveyor's inten-
tion." ' This provision is significantly limited, in that principal dis-
tributions thereunder may not exceed $25,000 in the aggregate from
all trusts created by the same conveyor.
43
The statute has been principally utilized for the benefit of im-
pecunious income beneficiaries of small trusts which contain no express
power to invade principal for their benefit. The courts "are striking
down, whenever possible, these so-called nuisance trusts where the
corpus is so small that the benefits do not justify the trouble incident
to their administration." " In most of the reported decisions granting
termination, the corpus is small and the life tenant elderly, needy and
a primary object of the creator's bounty.4" Inability of such a trust
to support such a beneficiary is a "failure of purpose" under the statute.
Where the facts do not fit this pattern, termination has generally been
refused,4" and it is clear that the courts are so far interpreting "failure
of purpose" narrowly.
The principal present significance of section 2 (a) is that it allows
termination of trusts, even though all interested parties do not join.
It has been established that termination may be awarded under
section 2 (a) over the objection of one or more beneficiaries, 47 provided
they are given the notice the statute requires.4" More significantly, it
clearly permits termination where the trust has created interests in
minors or unascertained persons unable to give their consent.
49
42 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 201.2(b) (Supp. 1967).
43 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.2(a) (Supp. 1967).
4 4 Miller Trust, 27 Pa. D. & C. 239 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct 1962).
45 See ibid.; Ryan Trust, 11 Fid. Rep. 292 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct), aff'd
sub iwn. Ryan Estate, 404 Pa. 229, 127 A.2d 584 (1961) (per curiam) ; Merkel Trust,
3 Fid. Rep. 486 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. 1953).
4 6 Ballem Trust (No. 2), 12 Fid. Rep. 296 (Delaware County Orphans' Ct 1962);
Curdy Trust, 2 Fid. Rep. 253 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. 1953). See Curry
Appeal, 390 Pa. 105, 134 A.2d 497 (1957), where the settlor created a spendthrift
trust at the age of twenty-one, and sought to terminate it a few years later. The court
found that the purpose not only had not failed, but was positively pressing in view
of the settlor's dissipation of other funds.
4 7 Ryan Trust, 11 Fid. Rep. 292 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1961).
48 Curry Appeal, 390 Pa. 105, 134 A.2d 497 (1957).
49 See Coinment of Joint State Government Commission, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 20,
§ 301.2(a) (1950).
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Terminating trusts for "failure of purpose" antedated the Estates
Act of 1947. A number of lower court decisions in Pennsylvania
terminated small trusts for the benefit of a needy life tenant before
the Act was passed. The first decision appears to have been Auchu's
Estate."0 That decision relied wholly on section 336 of the Restate-
ment of Trusts, entitled "Termination in Case of Emergency," which
permits termination by the court if, owing to circumstances not
anticipated by the settlor, "continuance of the trust would defeat or
substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust."
This was followed in Posey's Estate,"' and in subsequent lower court
cases for which section 2(a) of the Estates Act was not available.
52
The doctrine has not been reviewed (other than in cases decided under
section 2 (a) of the Estates Act) by any appellate court in Pennsylvania.
The reliance of these cases on section 336 of the Restatement is
interesting, since that section is not only titled "emergency," but is
illustrated with cases involving threatened loss of the trust property.'
It is a companion to section 335, which allows termination if the
purpose of a trust becomes "impossible," and refers principally to the
destruction of the trust property. Neither section appears to con-
template the broad "failure of purpose" doctrine that the Pennsylvania
cases have articulated, though the relationship is undeniable. 4
These cases are not superseded by section 2(a)," which applies
to principal payments only up to $25,000.-l Beneficiaries seeking to
terminate a larger trust for "failure of purpose" must rely on the
prior case law. In doing so they must first determine whether ter-
50 38 Pa. D. & C. 33 (Cameron County Orphans' Ct 1939).
5152 Pa. D. & C. 127 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct 1944).
5 2 Exley Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C. 508 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct 1948);
Holmes Estate, 66 Pa. D. & C. 612 (Delaware County Orphans' Ct. 1940) ; Honeywell
Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 472 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct 1950) ; Kelby Estate, 80
Pa. D. & C. 1 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1952) ; Lamotte Estate, 84 Pa. D. & C. 260
(York County Orphans' Ct 1952) ; Hunsicker Trust, 2 Fid. Rep. 162 (Montgomery
County Orphans' Ct. 1952); Bosler Trust, 3 Fid. Rep. 635 (Cumberland County
Orphans' Ct. 1953), rev'd, 378 Pa. 333, 107 A.2d 443 (1954); Horst Estate, 86 Pa.
D. & C. 528 (Dauphin County Orphans' Ct. 1952) (alternative holding). See also
Keller Estate, 80 Pa. D. & C. 37 (York County Orphans' Ct 1952).
53 To the same effect, see 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 336 (2d ed. 1956).
54 The doctrine seems also to have derived something from the cases terminating
trusts on consent where there is "no material purpose" for continuing them. See
Bosler Trust, 3 Fid. Rep. 162 (Cumberland County Orphans' Ct. 1953); Kelby
Estate, 80 Pa. D. & C. 1 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct 1952).
Another parent, although the cases do not refer to it, may be the general rules
allowing deviation from the terms of the trust, and more specifically the line of cases
allowing a court to invade accumulated income, or even principal, for the benefit of
a needy beneficiary who will eventually be entitled to it anyway. See 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS
§ 168 (2d ed. 1956).
55 Section 2(c) of the Estates Act of 1947 provides: "Nothing in this section
shall limit any power of the court to terminate or reform a trust under existing law.'
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.2(c) (Supp. 1967).
56 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.2(a) (Supp. 1967).
928 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:917
mination on this ground requires the consent of all the beneficiaries.
In most of the cases, all of the beneficiaries did in fact consent, so the
question was not reached. In at least two cases all of the bene-
ficiaries did not consent, although none objected and the question was
not discussed.
57
The Commissioners' comment to section 2(a)," giving as a
reason for the enactment of the section the difficulty of terminating
small trusts because of the inability to obtain the consent of minor or
unascertained beneficiaries, suggests that prior to the statute such
consents were essential. This view is supported by analogy to the
discussion in part I, supra.5"
There is support for the contrary view. In Estate of Thomas
Robb," the guardian ad litem argued that the consent of all bene-
ficiaries was necessary to terminate a trust for failure of purpose,
just as it is for termination where there is no special or material
purpose for continuing the trust. That case involved a $250,000
trust to which section 2(a) of the Estates Act did not apply. Though
it did not find a failure of purpose, the court disagreed with the
guardian ad litem on this point and said:
In a substantial number of adjudications to which no ex-
ceptions have been taken this court has terminated trusts,
even over objections, on the basis of inadequacy of income,
although the principal sum- involved was much larger than
in [Auchs's Estate and Posey's Estate, where not all in-
terested parties had consented]. The practice followed has
been to permit the termination of a trust, whether spendthrift
or not, when it was economically unsound to preserve the
trust and the income was insufficient to achieve the testator's
objective."'
This view will probably be the one adopted. The cases pre-
ceding section 2(a) which first articulated the "failure of purpose"
doctrine, were clearly working from general equitable principles, in
an area where traditional property rules were freezing trust funds
which could be better used for the primary beneficiaries. It offended
ordinary concepts of justice that a life tenant, usually the wife or child
of the testator, must subsist on inadequate income, while principal
was preserved for a distant and unnamed class of remaindermen who
57 Posey's Estate, 52 Pa. D. & C. 127 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. 1944);
Auchu's Estate, 38 Pa. D. & C. 33 (Cameron County Orphans' Ct. 1939).
58 See note 49 supra.
59 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
60 No. 17, July Term, 1903 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct., June 22, 1961).
61 Ibid.
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could not legally consent to termination. Doubtless the "failure of
purpose" doctrine derives a good deal from the cases that allow
termination by consent of all beneficiaries if no "material purpose"
is served in continuing the trust. The very words "failure of pur-
pose" and "no material purpose" suggest a similarity. The two,
however, are quite different, and in that difference lies the reason why
the consent of all beneficaries should not be required to terminate for
failure of purpose. The "no material purpose" cases are the tradi-
tional ones allowing termination upon the consent of all the bene-
ficiaries. Such consent is the basis for termination. The "material
purpose" is merely a qualification: termination will not be allowed,
despite consent, if there is a material purpose in continuing the trust.
Failure of purpose, on the other hand, is a different, almost converse,
concept. It is a finding that the principal purpose for the creation of
the trust can be better accomplished by terminating or modifying it.
Logically, the consent or objection of one or more persons with bene-
ficial interests should be irrelevant.
The doctrine is relatively new. It is equitable in nature and
application, and depends wholly on the discretion of the court. To
date the courts have been relatively restrained in the exercise of this
discretion.'2
III
TERMINATION FOR MISTAKE
The rule allowing an instrument to be rescinded for mistake is
developing into a new tool to assist beneficiaries seeking to terminate
or modify a trust.' The courts have always allowed the termination
of a trust where it has been demonstrated that the settlor created it
under a mistake.' The mistake need not be "mutual" but may be
62Almost all of the cases involved a needy income beneficiary. However, in
Falkner Trust, 3 Fid. Rep. 495 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1953), judge Saylor
terminated a trust created to supplement a widow's income. The widow's income
had never needed supplementing, and while the court found the case "not strictly
one of 'failure of purpose'" it determined that it nevertheless came within that doctrine.
63 Like any instrument, a deed of trust may also be rescinded for fraud or undue
influence, but in the great majority of cases where this has been tried, the effort has
been unsuccessful. Quite obviously the pressure placed on a spendthrift, a weak-
minded person or a drunk to place his estate beyond his own reach is more approved
than criticized. Trusts were terminated on these grounds in Miskey's Appeal, 107
Pa. 611 (1883) and Rick's Appeal, 105 Pa. 528 (1884). They were upheld in the
face of charges of fraud or undue influence in King v. York Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141,
122 At. 227 (1923); Brendle's Ex'r v. Brendle, 274 Pa. 590, 118 At. 502 (1922);
Willard v. Integrity Trust Co., 273 Pa. 24, 116 Atl. 513 (1922) ; Potter v. Fidelity
Ins. Trust & Safe Deposit Co. (No. 1), 199 Pa. 360, 49 Atl. 85 (1901) ; Coleman's
Estate, 193 Pa. 605, 44 Atl. 1095 (1899); Neal v. Black, 177 Pa. 83, 35 Atl. 561
(1896); Reidy v. Small, 154 Pa. 505, 26 Atl. 602 (1893); Merriman v. Munson,
134 Pa. 114, 19 At. 479 (1890).
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 333 (1959); 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 333.4 (2d
ed. 1956).
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solely on the part of the settlor where, as is usually the case, the
creation of the trust is without consideration."
Until recently most of the Pennsylvania cases have involved the
omission of a power of revocation due to "mistake." Upon finding
such a mistake, which is a question of fact, the courts have permitted
the power to be exercised and the trust to be terminated.66 The courts'
earlier readiness to find this kind of mistake may have stemmed in
part from the general rule that a trust is irrevocable unless expressly
made revocable.
67
The courts no longer seem as ready to find a power of revocation
omitted by mistake. In part this may be due to the increasing com-
plexities of trusts, and to the fact that they are not entered into, as
a general rule, without intelligent consideration and legal advice.
68
Where, for instance, a trust must be irrevocable for tax reasons, a
court is unlikely to accept the argument that a power of revocation
was omitted by "mistake." 69
In any event, the courts are taking a more sophisticated approach.
On the one hand, they are making only such changes in the terms
of the trust as the circumstances require, without affecting the con-
tinuation of the trust. In Irish v. Irish,"° the reformation consisted
only of inserting a provision for an omitted contingency-the settlor's
survival of all the named beneficiaries. In Sawtelle Trust," reforma-
65 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 334 (2d ed. 1956).
66 Bristol v. Tasker, 135 Pa. 110, 19 Atl. 851 (1890) (settlor allowed to terminate
on a finding her mother told her she could revoke so long as she was single) ; Rus-
sell's Appeal, 75 Pa. 269 (1874) (settlor of sole and separate use trust failed to include
power to revoke if she should survive her husband). See also Armstrong v. German-
town Trust Co., 12 Pa. D. & C. 519 (Philadelphia C.P. 1929) ; Hood v. Leach, 29 Pa.
Dist. 517 (Philadelphia C.P. 1920); Geiger's Estate, 3 Pa. County Ct. 338 (Phila-
delphia Orphans' Ct. 1887) ; Hickman v. McFarland, 1 Pa. County Ct. 195 (Chester
C.P. 1886).
67 Donnan's Trust Estate, 339 Pa. 43, 13 A.2d 55 (1940) ; Wilson v. Anderson,
186 Pa. 531, 40 Atl. 1096 (1898).
68 In Curry Appeal, 390 Pa. 105, 134 A.2d 497 (1957), the settlor of a trust
created at 21, when seeking to terminate it only a few years later, alleged a mistaken
omission of a power to revoke (as well as a host of other grounds). The court found
him an intelligent person who knew what he was doing. In Irish v. Irish, 361 Pa.
410, 65 A.2d 345 (1949), a decision of the court below dismissing a petition for
reformation was reversed, and the case remanded to determine if an alleged omission
was due to the inadvertence of the scrivener or not. The deed had failed to provide
for the disposition of the property in the event the settlor survived all the named
beneficiaries. The reversion that would occur created unexpected tax consequences
to the settlor, as a result of a United States Supreme Court decision. Estate of
Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
69 In Fisher Trust, 12 Fid. Rep. 313 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962), one of
the purposes of the trust was to remove the assets from settlor's estate for tax
reasons, and the trust was expressly made irrevocable for that reason. Reformation
of the terms obviously could not be had by inserting an omitted power to revoke.
70 361 Pa. 410, 65 A.2d 345 (1949).
71 12 Fid. Rep. 665 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962).
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tion was granted to include as "issue" the adopted children of one
of the settlors. By the same token, the courts are giving short shrift
to beneficiaries asserting "mistake" among the grounds for seeking a
complete termination of the trust.7"
On the other hand, the courts seem to be taking a somewhat
broader approach to the question of what is a mistake. This is sug-
gested by Sawtelle Trust.' Since the trust was created in 1935 and
since it was not until 1940 that one of the settlors discovered she could
not have children, a traditional interpretation of "mistake" might not
have been adequate for reformation. In any event, the court found
that the settlors were young when, at their parents' request, they
created the trust; that they had not had an opportunity to discuss the
terms of the trust with the parents' attorney; and that there had
been no discussion of what "issue" meant. Stress was placed on the
fact that all the settlors agreed to the proposed change, and that to
allow it would be to approve a "family agreement."
A broad approach was also taken in Fisher Trust,74 where a settlor
had created three irrevocable trusts for the benefit of his children. He
and his wife were not beneficiaries of the trusts because of what he
believed to be adequate provision for them under certain employment
contracts. On later changing lawyers, the settlor learned that (i) since
the employment contracts were probably unenforceable, the expected
income to himself and his wife could not be guaranteed, and (ii)
though the trusts were aimed at removing the trust property from
settlor's estate for tax purposes, the reservation by him of a power
to invade principal for the beneficiaries would place the trust in his
estate. The court allowed reformation on the ground that the ex-
clusion of the wife from the trusts, and the inclusion of the taxable
power, were "mistakes" justifying reformation. Stress was placed on
the fact that settlor was blind and thus less able than most to "compre-
hend the complexities of the testamentary plan he created." 7' But
while the court based its conclusion on "mistake," it described the
proceeding as a request to the court "for permission to revise a trust
in which all of [settlor's] assets are tied up in an impractical, un-
workable and economically unsound plan." 76
72 E.g., Curry Appeal, 390 Pa. 105, 134 A.2d 497 (1957).
73 12 Fid. Rep. 665 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962).
74 12 Fid. Rep. 313 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962).
7- Id. at 323.
76 Id. at 324. The opinion does not specify just what reformation was ordered.
Nothing is said, for instance, as to efforts, if any, to amend the employment contracts.
Nor is it clear whether the deed was to be reformed to make only the wife, or both
she and settlor, income beneficiaries. If he was to be included, the trust would seem
to be taxable to his estate under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
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Kaufman Trust " evidences an even broader view and suggests
that a trust may be reformed, not merely for mistake in the tradi-
tional sense, but also where, because of lack of foresight or poor
judgment, the settlor has put himself in a difficult position. There the
settlor petitioned to terminate an irrevocable trust of substantial size
created ten years before, in which he had reserved the income for
life and given the remainder to his brothers or their issue. Subse-
quently his fortunes changed radically. The family company which
had paid him an annual salary in excess of $35,000 a year was sold,
his investments went sour, his health failed and he got married. He
sought termination on the ground of mistake, claiming that while he
realized the trust was irrevocable, he and his brothers thought that
meant only that settlor could not revoke by himself, but could revoke
if the brothers agreed (which they did). The court found "a
mistake of fact and law" sufficient to terminate, but in view of settlor's
prior unsuccessful speculations, ordered periodic payments of principal
to him or for his benefit instead of terminating the trust.
The only "mistake" in the traditional sense suggested by the
petitioner in this case was his belief that he and his brothers, the
named remaindermen, could terminate the trust by consent. Like
an omitted power of revocation, this would have resulted in the com-
plete termination of the trust, which the court expressly refused to
decree because of settlor's proven speculative habits. Instead the
court awarded a "partial termination" to permit settlor to pay certain
debts and receive a monthly income. Though the basis for the decree
was stated to be a mistake as to the power to terminate, it seems clear
that the court was in fact relieving settlor from an improvident scheme
into which it concluded he should not have entered. It expressly
relied not merely on the "mistake,"
but also the principles of law which dictate that we approach
the general problem of giving relief to a person who volun-
tarily places his own money in trust in a benign spirit, so
that in the end he should not be regarded as a stranger in
the realm of his own benevolence.78
These cases show a broader reference to general equitable prin-
ciples than the early mistake cases, 79 and suggest a similarity to the
development of the "failure of purpose" cases (part II, supra). In
Kaufman Trust, the similarity of termination for "mistake" and ter-
77 12 Fid. Rep. 550 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962).
78 Id. at 555.
70 In Sawtelle Trust, 12 Fid. Rep. 665 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962), the
court emphasized its power to wield all the powers of a court of equity. Id. at 668.
See also Fisher Trust, 12 Fid. Rep. 313, 314-15 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962).
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mination for "failure of purpose" is apparent, for what the court did
was to approve the invasion of principal, in a case in which it ex-
pressly found section 2(a) of the Estates Act to be inadequate because
of its $25,000 limitation. Here, as in the failure of purpose cases,
the rights of other beneficiaries and the necessity of their consent
may create problems. Logically the consent of the beneficiaries should
be unnecessary. In each of the above three Philadelphia Orphans'
Court cases,8° the attitudes and rights of all beneficiaries were con-
sidered material,"- but it should not be deduced from this that a pre-
requisite to reformation or termination for mistake is the consent of
all the beneficiaries. Rather it indicates that the courts will weigh the
rights of parties interested in the trust as an important factor in deter-
mining what equity dictates in a given case. That this factor is to be
given special weight is indicated by the uniform appointment of
guardians ad litem.1 It is significant that in the only recent cases
refusing relief on the ground of mistake, the petition was opposed by
another party.83
The broad view of mistake has been questioned by the most recent
decision of the Supreme Court. In LaRocca Trust,"4 the court re-
versed a decree of the lower court which had reformed a trust to make
the settlor one of the beneficiaries."' The reasons given suggest that
reformation or termination for mistake may still be viewed narrowly.
The court insisted that evidence of mistake must be "clear, precise,
80 See also Boles Trust, 15 Fid. Rep. 310 (Lackawanna County Orphans' Ct.
1965), where the court permitted the reformation of a partial release of a power of
appointment where it found releasor had made a "mistake" about the tax consequences
of the release.
81 In Sawtelle Trust, 12 Fid. Rep. 665 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962), the
first of the "special circumstances" listed by the court in favor of its conclusion was
that "[t]he original owners of the trust res are whole-heartedly and unanimously in
favor of the amendment." 12 Fid. Rep. at 670. In Fisher Trust, 12 Fid. Rep. 313
(Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962), the court described as "one of the most important
features of these proceedings . . . the effect of reformation upon the rights of
minors and possible unascertained interests," emphasized that a guardian ad litem
representing such interests had approved the reformation, and stressed that reforma-
tion would be a greater long range benefit to such interests than what might be
initially lost by diminishing their interests in the trust. In Kaufman Trust, 12 Fid.
Rep. 550 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962), a guardian ad litem was appointed and
agreed to the awards there made.
82 See notes 8, 34, 81 and text accompanying note 34 mipra.
83 LaRocca Trust, 441 Pa. 633, 192 A.2d 409 (1963), reversing a decree of the
Orphans' Court of Montgomery County, 12 Fid. Rep. 671, which reformed a deed to
make the settlor an income beneficiary. The settlor's grandson, who had been named
the income beneficiary, objected and appealed. See also Curry Appeal, 390 Pa. 105,
134 A.2d 497 (1959), where the trustee opposed termination successfully, and Cobaugh
Trust, 16 Fid. Rep. 377 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1966), where the settlor's request
to terminate was opposed by several parties, and was denied by the court which found
no "mistake," but merely a change of heart by the settlor, who did not get along
with the trustees.
84 411 Pa. 633, 192 A.2d 409 (1963).
85 For the subsequent history of this case, see LaRocca Trust, 419 Pa. 176, 213
A.2d 666 (1965).
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convincing and of the most satisfactory character," 86 a phrase rather
often used by the Supreme Court in trusts and estates cases when it
decides against the proponent of the evidence, and an idea not hitherto
expressed in a case involving termination or reformation of a trust.
Significantly, the court said, "any other rule would do havoc to the
status of many irrevocable trusts now in existence," and it briefly dis-
tinguished prior cases as ones where the reformation did not "sub-
stantially eliminate any operative provision of the trust instruments." 87
These statements, which suggest that an irrevocable trust will not be
modified unless it can be proven by clear evidence that a particular
mistake in its drafting was made, are not in accord with the broad
equitable principles which the lower courts have been developing. It
may be that LaRocca Trust was not a proper case for the application
of those principles, since it is not clear that the settlor was in financial
straits or had created an impractical or improvident scheme. On the
other hand the lower court had applied those principles, and the
Supreme Court's reversal reads as a repudiation of the principles as
much as a refusal to apply them.
88
A broad view of "reforming" a document for "mistake" could
lead to a re-writing of the dispositive provisions of a trust to accord
with what the settlor probably intended, even though his words say
something else. Duncan Trust,89 suggests such a possibility. There
the court "reformed" an inter vivos trust deed, after the death of the
settlor, solely on the testimony of the scrivener that he had made a
mistake in the preparation of the last amendment of the deed. The
effect of the language of that amendment was to give the remainder
to some, but not all, of settlor's grandchildren, a result which everyone
agreed was surely not intended. Plainly influenced by the particular
facts,9 ° the court was eager to reform the instrument, and did so by
86411 Pa. at 640, 192 A.2d at 412.
87 Ibid.
88 The only other recent supreme court decision on mistake is Scholler Trust,
403 Pa. 97, 169 A.2d 554 (1961), which is a curious and in some ways confusing
decision. In that case, alleged heirs of the creator of a charitable foundation, formed
by an irrevocable trust instrument, attacked its validity charging that certain purposes
stated in the instrument were not charitable. The court held the trust a valid chari-
table one, but added that the questioned purpose had been effectively removed by
two amendments to the trust executed by the settlor before his death. In view of
the fact that the trust was irrevocable and unamendable, the court stated that these
"amendments" amounted to a "reformation" of the trust to cure a "mistake." No
other case has ever suggested that reformation is something that can be accomplished
by the settlor out of court.
89 16 Fid. Rep. 189 (Washington County Orphans' Ct. 1965).
90 Settlor was 90 when she executed the amendment, which had been prepared
for her by an officer of the trustee bank who was also a lawyer, but who did not in
fact see settlor execute the amendment and did not even consult her about it. He
also testified that it was his secretary who made the mistake by including a clause
which should have been omitted.
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resort to the old English practice of striking out words found to be
included by mistake. One wonders if the court could have reached
the same result if the instrument had been a will, since it had been
duly executed and was in no way ambiguous or unclear.
CONCLUSION
Trusts are a fit subject for the application of flexible equitable
principles. In perhaps no other field is there so great a possibility that
unforeseen changes in circumstances will frustrate a purpose which
led to the fixing of unchangeable property rights years, or even
generations earlier. In general, the lower courts in Pennsylvania are
treating problems of termination or reformation of trusts with a greater
regard for general equitable principles than for traditional rules of
property. When tempered by due regard for the rights of all the
beneficiaries, as is so far the case, this is a healthy, realistic and just
approach. Currently the greater presence of the conscience of the
court is working both ways. On the one hand, it is allowing changes
in trusts for the benefit of the principal beneficiaries, both through the
failure of purpose doctrine and the principle of mistake. On the other
hand, it is narrowing the right of beneficiaries to terminate a trust
by consent through the broadening of the concept of the "material
purpose" which prevents beneficiaries from doing so.
Possibly there runs through these developments a hint of
paternalism, the idea that the court knows best whether a trust should
continue or not, and on what terms. If so, it may be a by-product of
rules which by their nature leave much to the courts' discretion. To
date the decisions have certainly given due regard to the intention of
the creator of the trust and the interests he has given to his bene-
ficiaries. What the recent decisions are recognizing is that it is often
unjust, and sometimes absurd, to honor slavishly the specific intention
of the creator of a trust after the passage of years and the development
of circumstances which he did not, and in many respects could not,
envisage. The recent decisions are sacrificing specific intent to a
general or underlying intent which can usually only barely be dis-
cerned from the trust instrument, and which the courts must find
primarily in their own knowledge of human experience. Indeed for
a court to look only to "specific intent" in the face of facts which
the settlor did not foresee, suggests either a blind spot or an un-
willingness to dig into the heart of the problem.
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